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Sociology and philosophy of science have an uneasy relationship, while the marriage of history and philosophy of science has – on the surface at least – been more successful. I will take a sociological look at the history of the relationships between philosophy and history as well as philosophy and sociology of science. Interdisciplinary relations between these disciplines will be analysed through social identity complexity theory in order to draw out some conclusions on how the disciplines interact and how they might develop. I will use the relationships between the disciplines as a pointer for a more general social theory of interdisciplinarity which will then be used to sound a caution on how interdisciplinary relations between the three disciplines might be managed.
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1. Introduction
Taking a cue from recent drives by Chang and others (e.g. Chang, 2004) to resurrect and theorise the idea of a fully integrated history and philosophy of science, there is also a so far rather smaller effort within that movement on including sociology as well (Nercessian, 2008; Francois et al., 2011). However, while of course there has always been a steady amount of interaction between sociologists and philosophers, the two disciplines of sociology and philosophy of science seem much further away, rhetorically, philosophically and institutionally, from achieving anything like the integrated HPS movements. 
This essay will attempt to theorise the interdisciplinary relations between history and philosophy of science as well as sociology and philosophy of science through analysing historical developments between the disciplines in light of  social identity theory, and consequently attempt to construct a theory of interdisciplinarity based on complex social identities which will hopefully inform how the relations between the three science studies disciplines can be managed and brought forward.
There have recently appeared a small number of different diagnoses on what went wrong with the philosophy / sociology relationship (such as Hull, 2000; Zamitto, 2004; Mirowski, 2004; Rouse, 2011; Ammon, 2011) focussing, with little agreement, on what the fundamental intellectual disagreements are (such as the contexts of discovery and justification distinction, as Ammon argues). However they mostly agree that now these old boundaries have become blurred, with prominent sociologists (for example Latour 2010) “coming out” as  philosophers while prominent philosophers (for example Kitcher 2001) have started covering the societal element of science. 
As an intended sociological contribution to the debate, this paper will not look in detail at the intellectual disagreements between the disciplines, beyond noticing that there must be more to the disagreements than purely intellectual reasons (after all, philosophers are themselves not known for their tendency to agree with each other, but still manage to form a cohesive disciplinary identity as evidenced by joint institutions such as journals, university departments and professional societies).
Hull summarises his argument about the relationship between the various science studies disciplines​[1]​ as “professionals defending their turf from invasion from outsiders” (2000, p. 79). Similarly, Rouse's rather modest conclusion about what can be done to bring the disciplines together is telling:

I do not pretend that science studies would merge into a happy interdisciplinary utopia if only anthropologists, philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science would read more widely in other disciplines and discover the extensive common ground that I have been describing. There are daunting substantive and rhetorical barriers to full appreciation of one another’s projects and approaches across these disciplinary boundaries. (Rouse, 2011, p. 23)

This paper is intended to be about those rhetorical boundaries and trying to find a way of approaching them more theoretically. The next two sections will look at two of these boundaries and the rhetorical work that lay behind their establishment as well as the attempts to rhetorically break them down, by first looking at the history of HPS and then at the history of the philosophy / SSK relationship and how that developed into the current relationship between philosophy and STS. I will then analyse these boundaries using social identity theory (Tajfel, 1984) as well as referencing to Gieryn's (1983; 1999) concept of boundary work. The final section will take contemporary theoretical developments from social identity research that account for multiple identities (Roccas and Brewer, 2002) and construct a general theory of interdisciplinarity which aims to account for the various relationships, boundary disputes and integration attempts of the three science studies disciplines in terms of the negotiation of complex social (academic) identities in an attempt to find a way forward.

2. Marrying History and Philosophy of Science
Zammito (2004) argues that one of the lessons of early attempts of integrating history and philosophy of science was that the benefits for history of aligning itself with philosophy's agenda were never made entirely clear, and the project fell out of the mainstream of philosophy of science in part because of a lack of enthusiasm from historians. Zammito terms this a “failed marriage”, which may be a bit strong a term: The HPS project has never really vanished and has recently received a new impetus, for example through Chang’s arguments on integrated HPS, as well as the more philosophically orientated work of historians like Rheinberger and the historical epistemology movement. These newer developments include the establishment of societies such as SPSP (Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice) and the integrated HPS workshop series which has been running in the UK annually for the past few years. However there were clear unresolved issues surrounding the HPS marriage, and the new integrated HPS movement is consciously different in its conception from previous HPS, most clearly demonstrated by Chang (2004), whose arguments I will outline further below. This may help the new movement in succeeding more than previous integration attempts, though of course it is still too early to judge whether the new HPS movement will ultimately be more successful.

In the postwar era, analytic philosophy of science faced a series of fundamental challenges that shaped the way the discipline would look for the foreseeable future. The seminal work of Quine (1980 [1953]) and Kuhn (1962) are frequently described as having shaken up philosophy of science and pointed it in new and different directions. In the cold light of hindsight we can see that neither of their contributions came completely out of the blue, developments by philosophers within the Vienna Circle have long pointed towards problems in the way philosophy was done, and in a way people like Quine merely extended that development (Rouse, 2005; Reisch, 2005).
Kuhn's work in particular spawned a number of efforts in marrying historical evidence with normative philosophy of science such as Laudan (1977). The most notable among those was Lakatos’ “sophisticated falsificationism” which attempted to show that there still is a deep rationality within science which works along broadly Popperian principles whilst still undergoing conceptual revolutions from time to time in the shape of the abandonment of “degenerating research programs” (Lakatos, 1970; 1978a). I will not discuss the philosophical objections and justifications of these early integrated HPS attempts as they have been discussed at length elsewhere; I will however attempt to summarize some of the non-philosophical arguments that have been made on why this approach was ultimately in need of overhaul by the contemporary HPS theorists. 
The first more conceptual argument was advanced by Zammito (2004): There seems to be a fundamental tension between using historical evidence as a given while philosophising about the conceptual foundations of scientific evidence and process because this overlooks the considerable philosophical problems on which the foundations of historical evidence itself rests. In elaborating a philosophy of science that rests on historical evidence, philosophers in effect undermined themselves by taking for granted in one discipline that they just argued cannot be taken for granted in others. 
Steve Fuller makes a similar observation regarding the realism/anti-realism debates between philosophers, historians and sociologists of science, which I would argue would be applicable more generally to HPS: 

All parties believe that the history of science bears decisively on the outcome of this debate, largely because they presume that historical inquiry is as epistemologically sound as any other empirical inquiry. This even goes for Kuhn and Feyerabend, both of whom are more concerned with how historical agents constructed their worlds than with the more strictly hermeneutical issue of how historians construct the historical agents. (Fuller, 1988, p. 65)

This seeming neglect of philosophy of science of the philosophy of history is not a new phenomenon, and was not in itself a fatal blow for HPS. Indeed, historiography is being routinely taught in history of science courses, even if the issues do not seem to be reflected often enough on in philosophers’ HPS work (see also Pinnick and Gale, 2000, for a more nuanced assessment of philosopher’s use of historical methods). I mention it here however because it relates to a similar issue which SSK has tried to grapple with from the outset and which philosophers wasted no time in pointing out; the problem of reflexivity. Reflexivity in SSK has too often been used in a number of “final” philosophers' refutations of SSK, but this hides some fundamental problems that any HPS should not ignore – there is also a potential reflexivity issue lying in the heart of new and old HPS.

The other, more serious problem that Zammito identified with the early integrated HPS, was of a social and disciplinary nature, and it is here that the tools of STS can fruitfully be brought to help gain understanding because it has a wider perspective on the “tribes” of academia and their various conflicts and synergies. This issue relates to how philosophers and historians of science understood their respective disciplines and what they were about, and most importantly, where the boundaries were supposed to lie. While intellectual interest by historians in philosophical issues and vice versa continued in the background, there was a lack of institutional integration – philosophers and historians remained separate academic tribes with their own interests and objectives. Joint projects and institutions such as History and Philosophy of Science departments at Cambridge or joint journals such as the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science existed to bridge this gap, but were not always terribly successful in bridging disciplinary divisions, as the journal's co-founder, Larry Laudan, himself admitted (Laudan, 1989, see quote below).
This may have been because the benefits for either discipline of closer collaboration were never really made clear enough. There was still a fundamental tension within philosophy about its own endeavour and what it really was that it wanted to find out about science, which relates to the fairly fundamental upheavals within philosophy of science at the time: The development of early HPS came at the same time as the rise of naturalised philosophy of science, where “grand theory of science as a whole has come increasingly to be displaced by disciplinary or problem-specific methodological and metamethodological study” (Zammito, 2004, p. 113). Grand meta-descriptive projects that aimed to rationalise all of science in the HPS tradition of Kuhn, Lakatos or Laudan slowly became unfashionable. But that also means that the problems that Lakatos and Laudan grappled with, successfully or not, were never really resolved. Thereafter, it became somewhat unclear what exactly philosophy would gain from history.
The added value of HPS must have looked even more absent from the point of view of historians: what did they gain from allying themselves with philosophers? “The important point here is that it was the historians of science who were finding it increasingly unproductive to link up with the philosophy of science” (Zammito, 2004, p. 111), a point Laudan himself acknowledged in his admission that the battle for an integrated HPS had been “exactly 50 per cent won”.

Contemporary philosophers of science, whatever their persuasion, are now prepared to grant that historically-based philosophy is not only a viable but valuable venture. By contrast, many (perhaps most) professional historians of science have refused to see the point. (Laudan, 1989, p. 12)

Laudan’s “glass half full” optimism however assumes that philosophers have all signed up to the HPS project, which as argued above may not quite be the case.

The current trend towards integrating history and philosophy of science addresses this disciplinary divide (wittingly or unwittingly) in part by positioning itself as historical as well as philosophical research. Chang's book and manifesto for a new integrated HPS (Chang, 2004) for example is not intended to merely use historical evidence in order to underline some vaguely defined normative philosophical purpose, but to actively contribute to historical research by uncovering actual contemporary philosophical problems that were tricky at the time but have been largely forgotten. The new HPS analyses how they had been solved and questions what implication these have for current scientific (and philosophical) practice. This is then combining novel historical research in its own right with a philosophical analysis. At the same time it attempts to solve the problem of finding a proper place for philosophy of science: Chang explicitly makes the argument that philosophy can be a complement to science by working on problems that scientists can't or won't work on due for example to institutional constraints (Chang, 2004, p. 238). One of the reasons why some problems are left uninvestigated by science is that they have already been solved – yet often the precise way they have been solved and what philosophical problems were encountered at the time have not been passed on along with the solutions. Here a combined history and philosophy of science can help because historical research can uncover these problems and along the way keep philosophy and scientists from having to re-invent the wheel when similar problems are encountered again.
This conception of philosophy is still placing integrated HPS somewhat apart from the grand narratives that characterised Lakatos and Laudan’s work, and instead works at the micro-level of philosophically analysing individual episodes and scientific problems. I am still personally unsure whether this abandonment is a completely desirable thing, but at least it spells out more clearly what the purpose of philosophy of science is, and thus avoids some of the conceptual problems that plagued early HPS: it clearly sets out what the role of history should be within the marriage, why philosophy needs it, and at the same time generating new research questions for history to work on. 
The definition of boundaries is therefore a clear advantage that the new HPS has over its predecessor: the discipline knows where it stands, where it wants to contribute and what it does not set out to do – thus stalling potential conflicts with non-HPS philosophers and historians who may otherwise feel their professional territory is being invaded. As the next section will argue, it was the competition over territory which fuelled the conflict between philosophy of science and SSK probably more than any intellectual disagreements.

3. Philosophy and SSK: How sociology and philosophy of science didn't even get beyond the first date
As reviewed above, early HPS has been described, somewhat unfairly considering the lasting impact of philosophers like Kuhn, Laudan, Toulmin or Lakatos, as a “failed marriage” by Zammito. I will continue torturing his metaphor though and assert that the sociology and philosophy of science relationship did not even reach that stage. The problems that this relationship has faced were slightly different to the HPS marriage, but these differences are illuminating: Instead of the disciplines being unsure about where they intersected (and whether they did intersect at all), sociology and philosophy of science staked out their grounds early on and started fighting over it. The neat disciplinary delineation between philosophy and sociology of science that existed between positivism / post-positivism and Mertonian functionalism had been questioned by the new generation of sociologists of scientific knowledge who consciously moved onto philosophical territory themselves and started arguing how their newly invigorated sociology can solve some of the deep fundamental crises that philosophy was going through at the time – and therefore supplant it. 
The “strong programme” of the sociology of science as developed by theorists such as Barry Barnes (1974), David Bloor (1976) and others made some decisive breaks with previous sociologies of science by explicitly widening the scope of social explanations to the content of scientific knowledge. Strong programme principles such the symmetry principle, and reflexivity, received a particularly hostile reception by philosophers.
Here I do not want to rehearse the merits (or lack thereof) of the strong programme arguments or the philosophical reactions to it, but I find it interesting to point out that now, 40 or so years later, new generations of sociologists of science routinely learn in introductory texts that the disagreements often rested on philosophers' misunderstanding of SSK (for example Yearley, 2005, p. 31, claims that Newton-Smith is one of the few philosophers who “grasps what is at stake for SSK” because he doesn't conflate the arguments of Bloor and Collins). This may or may not be the case, though I believe from the philosophers' point of view, that assertion is certainly not taken for granted. The reason I focussed here on how sociology of science is being taught to future generations of sociologists is to underline the acculturation effect that is driving disciplinary identities from the very start of a sociologist's career – philosophers are being portrayed as an identifiable outgroup that refused to understand the points made by SSK. This is interesting because sociology of science itself has moved on from SSK, and some of the most trenchant criticisms of its epistemology came from the subsequent waves of sociology of science (including the author of that very textbook, see Collins and Yearley, 1992).

The development of SSK needs also to be seen within the wider context of developments within sociology at the time. In its radical break from previous work in the sociology of science, the strong programme took part in a contemporary struggle over the aims, methods and purposes of the social sciences: the late 60s and 70s saw many often vicious challenges over methods and interpretations and even the whole purpose of sociology as well as other social sciences such as social psychology (Blackhouse and Fontaine, 2010; Moscovici and Markova, 2006) – it is the time that saw the developments of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) and the wider struggle for acceptance of qualitative methodologies and the epistemological problems they aim to solve and in turn initiated. In social theory, it has seen the abandonment of functionalism and “positivism” (in the Comptean sense used by sociologists) as embodied by Parsons or Merton and it struggled to not only find new theoretical meanings within the study of society but to redefine what the questions are that sociology should be asking about society in the first place. Whether SSK was deliberately a part of the social science upheaval of the time or whether it was just unconsciously part of the general Zeitgeist is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, SSK can be seen within the context of a wider struggle going on within the social sciences at the time. As part of that revolution and in their endeavour to re-invigorate sociological understanding of science, the new generation of sociologists of science recruited their own interpretation of Kuhn's challenge to philosophy of science (about which of course Kuhn himself was deeply unhappy), and consciously planted themselves as an alternative to the then current philosophy of science. This may have been a reaction to the positivism and post-positivism that philosophers like Popper or Hempel embodied and whose philosophy of (social) science was seen as inadequate for the new interpretative modes of sociological understanding – Popper as the grand old man of philosophy of science was inextricably linked with, from the new sociologists’ (not just of science) points of view, a philosophy of social science that they were in the process of overcoming. Even though at the time, positivism and even post-positivism were already fading within philosophy of science, the discipline as a whole was still seen, at least from the outside, as inadequate for the social sciences. For this reason it is interesting that Kuhn (and to a lesser extent the later Wittgenstein) were to be recruited by the new sociology of science as intellectual inspirations; they were seen as a decisive move away from the “positivist” style of philosophy that the new sociology was abandoning.
As Zammito argues, Bloor saw traditional philosophers as continuing the mindset of the old functionalist sociology which the new era of sociology was trying to supplant. He quotes Bloor: 

We might further wonder whether believing in a philosophical analogue of naïve sociological functionalism does not perhaps derive from holding implicitly the sociological version itself.... a picture of a society being projected, as it were, onto the logical realm. (Bloor, quoted in Zammito, 2004, p. 137)

Yet the stated aim by the strong programme of not only breaking with Mertonian functionalism and positivist philosophy of science but also of supplanting philosophy of science, entirely understandably created a certain amount of friction between philosophers and the new sociologists, which strengthened a defensive attitude even from those philosophers who the SSK theorists approved of. As Zammito argues on Kuhn's own misgivings towards the strong programme,

It would appear that Kuhn was defending orthodox sociology of science from the new school, but in fact his hostility arose from the even more adversarial stance of the Strong Program toward the philosophy of science. From the outset the Strong Program pursued confrontation with philosophy of science even more than with the sociology of science. The Strong Program undertook to displace philosophy by sociology: its tenor and reception cannot otherwise be accounted for. (Zammito, 2004, p. 137, original italics) 

He also quotes Bloor's attitude towards the sociology / philosophy relationship: 

Whereas Winch thinks that much of sociology is misbegotten philosophy, the argument in this paper has been that much philosophy is misbegotten sociology (Bloor, quoted in Zammito, 2004, p. 138)

Though Bloor was the most vocal proponent of replacing philosophy, Zammito also cites John Law's essay “Is epistemology redundant? A sociological view” (Law, 1975) in support of his view that the new sociologists of science were trying to supplant traditional philosophy of science. A similar view is also advanced in Shapin’s (1995) review of the state of SSK and science studies.
The general idea that sociology of science competes with philosophy of science, rather than complementing it, is also apparent in contemporary philosophy of science, for example Lakatos’ argument against Kuhn:

one cannot replace philosophy of science by sociology of science as the supreme watchdog.  If both history and sociology of science are norm-impregnated, rational appraisal of scientific progress must precede, not follow, full scale empirical history. (Lakatos 1978b, pp. 115-116, quoted in Gillies, 2014, original italics)

This, as Gillies points out, stands somewhat in contradiction with Lakatos' more famous assertion that “philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind.” (Lakatos, 1978a), p. 102; though the second half of that assertion had previously already been made by Hanson, 1962), since the same arguments that Lakatos advances against sociology of science must also apply to history. Lakatos' remark about philosophy of science being a “supreme watchdog” does however demonstrate that philosophy is seen as the dominant discipline here. While I'm not judging whether this is a reasonable argument, it does show where in any interdisciplinary interaction the power is supposed to lie. This privileging of philosophy as the dominant partner does not necessarily go down well when looked at from the outside. And it wasn't just Lakatos: Barry Barnes caricatured Laudan's (1977) argument on the relative roles of philosophy and history of science:

Although historians cannot confront the past without ‘normative bias’, philosophers, apparently, are less restricted; they get closer to history than historians themselves. When philosophers test their models of rationality against archetypical episodes in the history of science, it is to the actual past of science (HOS1 in Laudan) that they must refer, not to the writings of historians about that past (HOS2 in Laudan). Somehow philosophers must bypass the written history and get at the actual past, a task apparently beyond the mere historian. (Barnes, 1972, p. 252)

Though this is of course Barnes’ interpretation of Laudan, it underlines nevertheless an outsider’s perception of a rather heavy-handed approach to the profession of history of science on part of the philosophers which may help explain why historians have been less than enthusiastic in taking up Laudan’s version of HPS.
The fact that it was an SSK sociologist who made this observation is significant here, as this may explain why SSK felt it was a better strategy to position itself against philosophy rather than trying to work with philosophy: if the philosophers’ treatment of history of science is to be an indicator, sociologists would always play second fiddle and have to accept the normative philosophical theorising that they intended to impose on the historians – that constraint however would negate the intellectual advances that SSK (at least thought it) had made to move away from Mertonian functionalism. Though these were in effect philosophical arguments that SSK made, it may have felt forced out of collaborating on these points with philosophers.

4. SSK, history, philosophy and identity 
Whether at the end there really was a misunderstanding by philosophers of SSK is an interesting but separate (and in any case already much chewed over) question. The feeling that there was a misunderstanding does however show that the sociologists felt that philosophers should have seen their positions as at least perfectly defensible, even if they do not agree with them themselves. This should make sense: fundamental differences of opinion within philosophy after all are commonplace. Altercations between disagreeing philosophers can become quite vitriolic, but wholesale denunciation of a whole group of disagreeing philosophers in the manner that happened with SSK and the subsequent waves of STS is something altogether different (though comparable to the treatment analytic philosophy of science meted out to continental philosophers – in terms of its relation to sociology, it cannot have helped either that sociologists have later started looking towards continental philosophers such as Foucault for their philosophy of social science; I suspect mostly because analytic philosophers of science have to date shown little interest in the qualitative and interpretative social sciences). 
Yet as has often been remarked SSK’s philosophy bore many relations with established philosophers, and of course they themselves openly took much of their inspiration (though without much approval) from philosophers such as Kuhn and Wittgenstein. For example, as Yearley (2005, p. 24) argued, there is a clear connection between Quine’s psychological naturalism and the sociological arguments advanced by Bloor. The difference in the reception between Quine and Bloor by philosophers is something that Yearley attempts to explain by the different usages of psychological and sociological metaphors: “[W]hat excused Quine from much of the hostility directed at Bloor was the fact that a psychological naturalism can appear quite unthreatening” because “we have long ago grown used to talking about knowledge through the metaphor of perception” (Yearley 2005, p. 24). Yearley’s analysis thus points towards social (i.e. non-philosophical) reasons for why the receptions differed, underlining his point mentioned above that he thinks most philosophers misunderstood SSK.
It therefore seems clear that there were many parallels between the arguments advanced by some philosophers and the SSK theorists and thus it seems unlikely that only intellectual philosophical differences can account for the hostility between SSK and philosophy of science.  A comparison with the treatment received by Kuhn (and his rather defensive reaction towards being appropriated by SSK) may show that the disagreement must have been more than just philosophical: Intellectually, Kuhn’s ideas were not unanimously accepted by his philosophical peers, who argued (and still do) that his definitions of paradigm were unclear (as shown in Masterman's famous 1970 argument), or that his sociology has no place in philosophy (as shown by the quotes from Lakatos above). Yet despite this resistance to Kuhn’s work it was realised that he had a point of sorts which helped spawn the HPS approaches of Lakatos or Laudan, and of course Kuhn is still routinely taught in undergraduate philosophy of science courses, unlike the philosophical arguments from SSK (at least in my experience). 
If, as I have tried to argue, purely intellectual disagreements cannot completely account for the division between philosophers and sociologists of science, we can try to analyse what happened using the tools of STS itself. Since here we had two sets of scholars from different disciplinary affiliations fighting over the same intellectual ground, this would be an almost textbook example of the boundary conflicts that STS has identified in other academic fields (Gieryn, 1983; 1995; 1999). As a personal preference, I would point out that boundary work analyses can easily be made through recourse to social identity theory, which currently enjoys an almost paradigmatic status within social psychology. As  has been argued elsewhere (Riesch, 2010), boundary work and identity theory both describe pretty much the same phenomena of social behaviour, and I will use both in the analysis here.

Analytic philosophy, and its subdiscipline of philosophy of science, has at the time already had a strong disciplinary identity, with a shared history, traditions and (within philosophy) a shared group of enemies: Though people were no longer positivists (even if logical positivism never was an intellectually completely coherent enterprise, it did form a strong social group itself), its traditions (emphasis on language, logic etc.), problems (verificationism, theory-ladenness, etc.), language and common enemies (continental philosophers such as Heidegger) were taken over. This strong identity of the (analytic) philosophy community can easily override internal intellectual divisions in the face of threats from the outside – witness the vehemence with which continental philosophers were (and still are) received. This self-categorisation is a very common and human reaction, and a cornerstone of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981). Groups with a strong common identity can form astonishingly easily (as researched within the minimal group paradigm, Tajfel, 1982; Hogg and Abrams, 1988, pp. 49-51) and over time strengthen the common identity further through the simple fact of now being in the same group. Group identity enhances ingroup favouritism as well as outgroup stereotyping: Through the accentuation effect similarities (in thinking, appearance, adherence to ingroup norms and values) within the group are accentuated, and differences downplayed to strengthen the group identity. Possible similarities of outgroup members with ingroup attributes are similarly downplayed. Through these mechanisms individual group members' self-esteem is enhanced as they see themselves as conforming to characteristic ingroup norms and values, as these characteristics are usually seen as the more positive and desirable, as compared to the negative and undesirable characteristics that are perceived to define the outgroup(s). The typical example is nationalism and nationalist outgroup stereotyping, and this is partly one of the effects Tajfel, as a refugee from war-torn Europe, was keen on explaining with his theory (see the preface to Tajfel, 1981).
With this in mind, the reception of SSK can be understood a bit better – because the SSK theorists explicitly stated that they are not philosophers, they pre-empted any possible categorisation by philosophers as belonging to their own group. Being thus part of an outgroup from the point of view of philosophy of science, SSK presented a tangible threat to that group: even while they rejected the philosophy group identity, they simultaneously tried to advance philosophical arguments which moreover they argued would supplant those of the philosophers – this is a threat that was never comparably posed by historians of science. This has thus escalated away from a purely intellectual dispute between philosophers who disagree, and into a situation where two groups, philosophers and sociologists, fight over the same intellectual space. To take up Gieryn’s metaphor of boundaries, both groups have clearly delineated their boundaries and asserted on which side of the border they belong. Unfortunately those boundaries overlapped, so they fought a war over where the boundary should be – for the philosophers this was a war of survival because SSK aimed to supplant philosophy of science. 
While philosophers could arguably accept exactly the same intellectual points of SSK’s criticism if they had been advanced from the ranks of philosophers (or sociologists who cross over the border and join their community), they could not do that with SSK at large, because that would have eliminated their group, or at least conceded that it should be obsolete. Kuhn for example self-categorised as a philosopher and as Zammito has suggested, his self-identification firmly on the philosophy side may have contributed to his later disapproval of the sociologists he inspired.

Therefore, through some possibly unfortunate rhetorical tactics on behalf of SSK, the SSK / philosophy of science relationship never really developed into an amicable discussion. This may be slightly ironic since we may have expected sociologists in particular to be more aware of the social and institutional challenges their rhetoric would bring to philosophy – but this is of course assuming that a good relationship would have been seen as desirable. For SSKs purposes, that rhetorical positioning did quite well, because it established sociology of science as an autonomous discipline that is not beholden to what philosophers think to impose on them, as they had tried on history. This helped them make a decisive break from the old Mertonian functionalist sociology which in some ways was their real enemy and which had let philosophy impose serious limitations on its subject matter and methodologies. The development of SSK also needs to be seen not only through its relationship with philosophy of science, but with its relationship with wider social scientific developments of the time, as I suggested above.
40 years later SSK no longer characterises mainstream sociology of science and the arguments that raged over issues such as the symmetry principle seem somewhat outdated. Yet current sociology of science is still very much bound within a common social identity to the earlier theorists whose intellectual heritage is openly acknowledged and celebrated as any STS textbook will demonstrate. Therefore while the philosophical disputes between sociology and philosophy of science may not be as relevant as they may have been earlier, both disciplines seem to have become estranged and interaction between them – though possibly more polite than before – has become infrequent and distant.

5. Interdisciplinarity and social identity complexity
The interpretation of the relationships between the disciplines as an identity conflict is a starting point, but does not address the more complex identities that arise through interdisciplinarity – we can easily see that things are more complex than a simple ingroup / outgroup characterisation when theorists try to forge identities that merge two different ingroups. To explore this further, I will in this section sketch a general theory towards the social psychology of interdisciplinarity and then apply it to the interdisciplinary endeavours of early and contemporary HPS, STS and any potential integrated Sociology and Philosophy of Science.

When academic disciplines are seen through the lens of social identification, we can start making sense of disagreements between disciplines which has on slightly different but comparable theoretical terms already been done at length by researchers in STS, mainly by working through Gieryn's (1999) influential boundary work concept (see especially his chapter on the “science wars”). Interdisciplinarity however offers a problem to boundary work analyses of academic identities because of the plurality of possible identifications with different groups which leads to individual scientists potentially identifying with different and possibly competing disciplines – the various integration attempts of history and philosophy of science would be an example here of the complexity of ingroup – outgroup identifications. 
As explicitly acknowledged within the theoretical framework of social identity, there is nothing that stops people from identifying with several different social groups; a person can for example identify simultaneously as belonging to the groups of “women”, “physicists”, “Scots” and “amateur football players”, and these identifications may be more or less strong depending on the social context in which a person is acting (Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty, 1994). When for example casting a vote in the Scottish independence referendum, this particular physicist will be more likely to identify through her nationality rather than her profession, hobby or gender, while at her workplace she will probably more likely identify as a physicist. She may also however experience a more complex identity when for example discussing the fact that there are so few female physicists, in which case a compound identity of “female physicist” may dominate.
Although social identity theory has long acknowledged the fact that people have several sometimes complementing, sometimes orthogonal and sometimes even competing identities, the emphasis has mostly been on relatively uncomplicated ingroup – outgroup conflicts and relations rather than that between different and overlapping ingroups. It is only relatively recently that theorists have started looking at complex identities. In a fairly recent but already seminal paper, Roccas and Brewer (2002) outline an approach they term “social identity complexity theory” which augments social identity theory by taking into account membership of different and potentially competing groups.
Suppose a subject identifies with two social groups, and these overlap only partially (i.e. ingroup members of one group may be outgroup members of the other), for example the female physicist mentioned above. Four possible stances are outlined, which, drawing on Tetlock (1983), Roccas and Brewer argue become progressively more difficult and complex to manage: 
a) Intersection, where the subject identifies with the intersection of both; in the example above, our physicist might identify primarily with other female physicists more so than with physicists at large or women at large, and other ingroup members are restricted to the (sadly still) fairly small group of female physicists.
b) Dominance, where one of the two identities dominates over the other. The female physicist may see all other physicists as fellow ingroup members, the other identity then is more of a secondary group.
c) Compartmentalisation, where “multiple identities can be activated and expressed through a process of differentiation and isolation” (Roccas and Brewer, 2002, p. 90), depending on the context or situation the subject finds herself in, as outlined in the example above (this is also the way traditionally social identity theory dealt with complex identities, see also Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty, 1994).
d) Merger, where ingroup identification is extended to other members of either group; i.e. in the example above, all women and all physicists are part of the ingroup.

We can then extend this analysis to wider academic management of complex identities as a way of thinking about interdisciplinarity. In this sense, we can recognise that, although individual academics' complex identity management may be varied, there are also trends that can be extended to a wider disciplinary / interdisciplinary group management, where in some interdisciplinary fields one type of complex identity management dominates, whereas in other fields other types dominate.
Within the science studies fields we can therefore identify the original HPS marriage that was dominated by philosophers as a “dominant interdisciplinarity”, where the (prototypical) HPS theorist such as Laudan or Lakatos primarily identifies as a philosopher first and a historian second. Historians entering the HPS field start from a position of outgroup member and therefore face difficulties in achieving ingroup status, which explains why historians felt somewhat unpersuaded to join the original HPS.
The more recent integration attempts in HPS however seem to have constructed more of an “intersected interdisciplinarity”, where the (again, prototypical) HPS theorist identifies with other HPS scholars while the wider history and philosophy of science communities are outgroups. In this mode of interdisciplinarity, ingroup cohesion between the history and philosophy elements is strengthened to the extend of building a new integrated interdisciplinary identity, but this comes at the price of losing touch with the two source disciplines.
We could possibly identify a “merged interdisciplinarity” as an ideal that both HPS marriages would strive for. In this mode of interdisciplinarity, both source disciplines are ingroups as far as the HPS theorist is concerned, and therefore reservoirs of potential collaborations, ideas and new approaches. It is possibly then a merged interdisciplinarity that is most often thought about when theorists on interdisciplinarity extol the virtues of pooling together, through for example the inclusion of outsider perspectives (e.g. Nissani, 1997). Unfortunately, in Roccas and Brewer's scheme, merged identities are identified as the most complex to maintain.
We can correspondingly see this as an ideal HPS that unfortunately has not quite been realised, not through lack of intellectual motivation on part of its proponents, but as part of the natural social dynamics that tend to follow group identifications in a wider sense found by social identity complexity theory. The new integrated HPS movement seems already to have moved away from both source disciplines and being viewed with suspicion (i.e. as a potential outgroup) by them, as well as seeing them as outgroups. This is not a conscious decision made by integrated HPS theorists and rather demonstrates one of the potential pitfalls of interdisciplinary movements: The greater the cohesion within the interdisciplinary intersection, the more it differentiates itself from the source disciplines.
This seems to be an almost inevitable trade-off; we can either go along the way of greater cohesion within the interdisciplinary grouping at the eventual expense of cohesion with the source discipline mainstreams, or we can stay primarily within (one of) the source disciplinary mainstream but at the expense of potential recruitment from other source discipline into the interdisciplinary project. Reaching an ideal “merged” interdisciplinarity is therefore difficult for a reason.
The fourth type of complex identity seems to be rather difficult to discern on a social group level, as a “compartmentalised interdisciplinarity” would require the individual theorists to identify with one or the other source discipline depending on context. I do not particularly see this either happening within HPS or being promoted as an ideal case. However in individual contexts of theorists trying to maintain a dual identity without a wider interdisciplinary institutional context such as HPS from within which to do that, a compartmentalised interdisciplinarity may be the only option, and therefore seems to represent how the relatively few interdisciplinary sociology and philosophy of science theorists manage their identities: for example we might present ourselves as sociologists when writing for sociology journals and philosophers when writing for a philosophy audience. This seems to correspond to the complex identity I carried around with myself at the beginning of my career, before the job market pushed me firmly into the sociology camp.

These four ways of approaching interdisciplinarity present different ways of working across disciplines and are not necessarily inferior or superior to each other. While I suggested above that a “merged interdisciplinarity” might be seen as an interdisciplinary ideal because there the individual theorists are versed with the wider disciplinary conversations happening in the source disciplines and will therefore be better able to use the insights of one discipline to inform work in the other and vice versa as well as more welcoming of outsiders entering the interdisciplinary field, there are also negatives with a fully merged interdisciplinarity because on a larger scale this would mean that the source disciplines could loose their distinctiveness as they become submerged into a wider interdisciplinary collaboration (i.e. if everybody is successfully persuaded that HPS is the best approach to philosophy of science, what happens to non-historical philosophy of science?). If on the other hand only a few theorists of either side take the road of merged interdisciplinarity then we run the danger of creating a third group as an intersection of the two source disciplines which would then travel along a trajectory of building an intersected interdiscipline which sets itself apart from either source. Founding or joining a completely new social group in the form of a merged identity makes maintaining non-confrontational contact with the previous groups difficult, and by the second academic generation – in which some scholars may never have identified with one of the source disciplines – might have become almost impossible.
It seems that therefore there are a series of trade-offs and balances that have to be navigated when we want to create interdisciplinarity on an institutional level, as both the old and new HPS movements have tried, and that every decision to move the interdisciplinary enterprise along one direction will bring with it also some of the disadvantages that particular type of interdisciplinarity will cause.

6. Conclusion
When viewed as a boundary and identity conflict, understanding the history of the relationships between the three science studies disciplines can be brought beyond the actual intellectual disagreements. These I have argued were not as insurmountable as to occasion the level of intenseness and confrontation that characterised the early SSK and philosophy relationship, nor would they explain why historians remained largely unpersuaded by Laudan's HPS. Understanding the conflict through social identity can however also point towards how we might want to structure future interdisciplinary relations. Simply surging ahead to forge an interdisciplinarity between two disciplines on the otherwise very valid intellectual grounds of pooling resources, avoiding reinventions of wheels and adding each others' insights can easily ignore the social realities that govern and constrain the interactions of social groups and merged social groups. There are benefits to interdisciplinarity, but also trade-offs and the precise nature of those will differ depending on what particular type of interdisciplinarity develops; however being conscious of those might help avoid some potential pitfalls. This goes for the traditionally more cosy if not unproblematic relation between philosophy and history of science (where an integrated HPS can alienate itself from the source disciplines) as well for any potential integrated SPS.
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^1	 	A note on terminology: I will follow Hull and Rouse and use “science studies” as an umbrella term to designate all philosophical, historical and social studies of science. “Science and Technology Studies” (STS) will be used to designate general social studies of science. HPS is as usual; “integrated HPS” refers specifically to the current movement as championed by Chang. Sociology of science refers to sociological “grand narrative” approaches (such as those analysed by Blute and Armstrong, 2011), which includes the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK, which I will use synonymously with “strong programme”), Mertonion sociology of science, as well as the later developments of Collins, Latour etc. 
